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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wardwell Marsh contends the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the
evidence found as the result of a warrantless search of his person should be reversed because,
considering the evidence actually presented at the hearing on his motion, there was no probable
cause to search his person. The State’s response misunderstands the importance the district
court’s clearly erroneous factual findings have in regard to its analysis of the totality of the
circumstances. Additionally, its only argument on the merits of the issue actually on appeal is
directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court precedent on point. As such, this Court
should reject the State’s arguments and reverse the order denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to
suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Marsh’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to suppress the evidence found
on his person.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Marsh’s Motion To Suppress The Evidence Found On
His Person
A.

The Clearly Erroneous Findings The District Court Made Are Relevant Because They
Show The District Court’s Understanding Of The Totality Of The Circumstances Was
Improperly Skewed
The State does not contest Mr. Marsh’s assertion that several of the district court’s factual

findings were actually clearly erroneous. (See generally Resp. Br.) Rather, it contends that
those clearly erroneous findings had little relevance within the totality of the circumstances.
(Resp. Br., pp.4-6.) The State is mistaken. Those clearly erroneous factual findings, either on
their own or together, reveal that the district court’s analysis of the totality of circumstances was
improperly skewed.
For example, in regard to the syringe cap, the State correctly notes that its location on the
floor near the passenger seat is a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances. (See Resp.
Br., p.5.) However, the logic behind that argument actually belies the State’s contention that the
question of when that cap appeared on the floor board has less relevance. (See Resp. Br., p.5.) If
the cap were on the floor while Mr. Marsh was in the passenger seat, it might give increased
reason to believe Mr. Marsh possessed the drug paraphernalia.1 Compare State v. Zentner, 134
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Mr. Marsh does not concede that, if the cap was on the floor while he was in the passenger seat,
that would, ipso facto, mean there was probable cause to search him. As he pointed out in the
Appellant’s Brief, the presence of personal use amounts of drugs in the driver’s car does not
create probable cause to search the passengers. (App. Br., pp.10-11 (contrasting the decision in
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 368-72 (2003), where the totality of the circumstances
indicated all the occupants were involved in a drug-dealing venture.) Likewise, the presence of a
single syringe cap, particularly a single syringe cap in a car belonging to a person who had
visible puncture marks on his arms, indicates personal use by the owner of the car. (Tr., p.5,
Ls.16-18.) As such, even if that syringe cap was on the floor while Mr. Marsh was sitting in the
passenger seat, that fact does not create probable cause within the totality of the circumstances to
search Mr. Marsh.
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Idaho 508, 510 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding the totality of the circumstances gave probable cause to
believe the defendant, a passenger in the back seat of a car, had constructive possession of the
backpack also sitting on the back seat). However, if the cap appeared in that location while the
driver was rummaging around in the glove compartment (as the officer’s testimony stated
(Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.2)), that fact would indicate the cap had initially been either on the
driver’s person or stored inside the glove compartment.
The totality of the circumstances in the latter scenario would single out the driver as the
owner of the cap. That would, in turn, mean there was not probable cause under the totality of
the circumstances to justify the search of Mr. Marsh’s person even though that paraphernalia had
been found in the car in which he had been a passenger. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 592-94 (1948) (holding there was no probable cause to search the defendant despite the fact
that contraband had been found in the car in which he was a passenger); State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding probable cause to search the car does not equate to
probable cause to search the passengers in the car). Therefore, the clearly erroneous finding
about when the officer said he saw the cap was relevant because it improperly skewed the district
court’s understanding of the totality of the circumstances, leading it to an improper conclusion
about probable cause.
The same is true of the district court’s clearly erroneous finding that there were several
baggies in the Altoids tin. The presence of one baggie in the Altoids tin (as the testimony
actually stated (Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25)) indicates those drugs were for the driver’s personal use,
whereas the presence of multiple baggies (as the district court considered (R., p.81)) would tend
to indicate a drug dealing operation involving all the people in the car. See Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 368-69 (2003) (specifically considering the presence of multiple glassine bags of
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drugs as indicating there was a drug dealing operation which involved all the occupants of the
car). Therefore, the district court’s erroneous factual finding about the number of baggies in the
Altoids tin was also relevant because it, too, improperly skewed the district court’s
understanding of the totality of the circumstances and, as a result, its finding regarding probable
cause.
In that same way, the district court’s clearly erroneous finding that the house at which the
car had stopped did not belong to any of the occupants of the car added a fact into the district
court’s consideration of the totality of the circumstances that it should have not considered.
When, as here, the evidence at the hearing was silent as to who owned the house (see generally
Tr.), the ownership of the house would have no impact one way or the other as to whether there
was probable cause to search the passengers in the car.
Finally, in regard to whether Mr. Marsh admitted to having drugs on his person, as the
State correctly notes (Resp. Br., pp.5-6), if that admission happened after the officer began to
search Mr. Marsh, it could not be used to find the search reasonable. E.g., State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 660 (2007) (reaffirming that whether a search is reasonable is determined by the facts
known to the officer at the time he begins the search). That, however, does not mean the district
court’s conclusion that such a fact existed was not clearly erroneous. Rather, that indicates the
district court’s decisions were not based on a proper understanding of the facts in this case,
particularly when that clearly erroneous finding is considered alongside the other clearly
erroneous findings the district court made.
As such, the State’s attempt to downplay the district court’s clearly erroneous findings of
fact as irrelevant is mistaken. They are all relevant as they, independently or cumulatively, show
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that the district court was not making decisions based on a proper understanding of the totality of
the circumstances in this case.

B.

A Proper Understanding Of The Totality Of The Circumstances Reveals There Was Not
Probable Cause To Search Mr. Marsh’s Person
The State devotes substantial time to evaluating whether the initial traffic stop, the call

for the drug dog, and the search of the vehicle itself were reasonable. (Resp. Br., pp.6-9.)
However, Mr. Marsh did not challenged those aspects of the encounter below or on appeal. (See
R., p.83; see generally App. Br.) That is because United States Supreme Court and Idaho
precedent makes it clear that, whether or not those other searches and seizures were reasonable
has no bearing on whether the search of Mr. Marsh’s person was also reasonable. Di Re, 332
U.S. at 592-94 (concluding that, even though there was actually contraband in the car, the
officers did not have probable cause to arrest or search Di Re, a passenger in the car); Gibson,
141 Idaho at 283-84 (explaining that the mere fact that the officers have probable cause to search
the car in which the passenger had recently been sitting does not give the officers probable cause
to search the passenger himself). In fact, the State does not acknowledge the relevant holding in
Gibson at all. (See generally Resp. Br. (only citing Gibson for the proposition that an alert by a
drug dog provides probable cause to search the car itself).) As such, no further reply is needed in
regard to the State’s irrelevant arguments about the other searches and seizures in this case.
In regard to the issue actually on appeal – whether the search of Mr. Marsh’s person was
reasonable – the State contends that the question is not one of ownership of the drugs, but rather,
only one of access to the drugs. (Resp. Br., pp.9-11.) That argument is directly contrary to the
United States Supreme Court precedent on point. Rather, the Supreme Court has expressly held
that the analysis of whether there is probable cause to search a passenger of a car based on the
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presence of contraband in the car turns on whether there are indications of who owned that
contraband:

“No such singling out occurred in this case; none of the three men provided

information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or money.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374
(emphasis added).
In fact, it was on the basis of indications of ownership, not indications of accessibility,
that the Pringle Court distinguished the decision in Di Re. Id. In Di Re, the officers had
information that the driver of the car was distributing counterfeit gas ration coupons, and they
saw the passenger in the back seat actually holding the counterfeit coupons. Id. at 373-74
(explaining the decision in Di Re, 332 U.S. at 592-94). However, there were no facts suggesting
that Di Re, the passenger in the front seat, had been involved in the transaction at all. Id. Since
the facts only indicated that the driver and the passenger in the back seat had control over, and
thus, ownership of, the coupons (regardless of whether the coupons were in a place that was
“accessible” to everyone in the car), the United States Supreme Court held there was no probable
cause to suspect Di Re of criminal conduct, and as such, there was no basis to arrest or
warrantlessly search him. Id.; compare State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 578 (2010) (finding
probable cause to arrest, and thus search, all the passengers because there were no indications of
ownership regarding the “scrunchy” in which the drugs were found in the car). Therefore, this
Court should reject the State’s only argument on the merits of the issue actually raised on appeal,
as it is directly contrary to the relevant precedent.
In this case, the totality of the circumstances singles out the driver, who had visible
puncture marks on his arms, as the owner of the personal-use amount of drugs and paraphernalia
found in his car. The State does not actually contest Mr. Marsh’s analysis in that regard. (See
generally Resp. Br.) As such, the totality of the circumstances reveals there was no probable
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cause to justify the warrantless search of Mr. Marsh’s person simply because the driver’s drugs
happened to be in the car, even if they were in a place technically accessible to Mr. Marsh.2 See
Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373-74; Di Re, 332 U.S. at 292-294; Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283-84. As such,
this Court should reverse the district court’s order denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to suppress the
fruits of that unlawful warrantless search of his person.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Marsh respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRD/eas
2

The officer testified that nothing of interest was within the lunge area of the person sitting in
the back seat of the car. (Tr., p.15, Ls.18-19.) Thus, the record is not clear as to how, exactly,
the Altoids tin was accessible to Mr. Marsh but not accessible to the passenger in the back seat.
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